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But we set out to discuss Mr. Meline's book, not the broad question of Mary's guilt or innocence. We repeat that, with all his ingenuity, Mr. Meline fails to satisfy us. He makes the mistake of subjecting historical testimony to the precise rules of legal evidence. His undisguised partisanship has led him to miss an excellent opportunity of enriching our literature with a valuable monograph.

9.—*Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom.* By EDWARD B. TYLOR. Two vols. 8vo. London: John Murray. 1871.

FOR those who were so fortunate as to read Mr. Tylor's admirable essays on the "Early History of Mankind," published in 1865, the present work needs no introduction or recommendation from us. Those who have not read the earlier volume, and who know the author only by hearsay, or not at all, have yet before them an intellectual feast the like of which they will have seldom enjoyed. For the present is one of the few erudite treatises which are at once truly great and thoroughly entertaining. The learning displayed in it would do credit to a German specialist, both for extent and for minuteness, while the orderly arrangement of the arguments and the clearness and elegance of the style are such as we are accustomed to expect from French essay-writers. And what is still more admirable is the way in which the enthusiasm characteristic of a genial and original speculator is tempered by the patience and caution of a cool-headed critic. Patience and caution are nowhere more needed than in writers who deal with mythology and with primitive religious ideas; but these qualities are too seldom found in combination with the speculative boldness which is required when fresh theories are to be framed or new paths of investigation opened. The state of mind in which the explaining powers of a favorite theory are fondly contemplated is, to some extent, antagonistic to the state of mind in which facts are seen, with the eye of impartial criticism, in all their obstinate and uncompromising reality. To be able to preserve the balance between the two opposing tendencies is to give evidence of the most perfect scientific training. Among contemporary writers, Mr. Darwin affords, perhaps, the most striking example of this union of speculative boldness and critical sobriety; and we do not know how we can more aptly express our sense of the thoroughness of Mr. Tylor's scientific culture than by saying that he constantly reminds us of the illustrious author of the "Origin of Species."

If Mr. Tylor's book also perpetually reminds us of Mr. Cox's "Mythol-

ogy of the Aryan Nations," it is doubtless by the association of opposites, though with regard to the questions discussed there is some kinship between the books. It may, we fear, seem ill-natured in us to say so, but Mr. Cox's uncurbed enthusiasm in illustrating by every available example the physical theory of the origin of myths, has certainly the curious effect of weakening the reader's conviction of the soundness of the theory. For our own part, though by no means inclined to waver in adherence to a doctrine once adopted on good grounds, we never felt so much like rebelling against the mythologic supremacy of the Sun and the Dawn as when reading Mr. Cox's volumes. That Mr. Tylor, while defending the same fundamental theory, awakens no such rebellious feelings, is due to his clear perception and realization of the fact that it is impossible to generalize in a single formula such many-sided correspondences as those which primitive poetry and philosophy have discerned between the life of nature and the life of man. Whoso goes roaming up and down the elfland of popular fancies, with sole intent to resolve each episode of myth into some answering physical event, his only criterion being outward resemblance, cannot be trusted in his conclusions, since wherever he turns for evidence he is sure to find something that can be made to serve as such. As Mr. Tylor observes, no household legend or nursery-rhyme is safe from his hermeneutics. "Should he, for instance, demand as his property the nursery 'Song of Sixpence,' his claim would be easily established; obviously the four-and-twenty blackbirds are the four-and-twenty hours, and the pie that holds them is the underlying earth covered with the overarching sky; how true a touch of nature it is that when the pie is opened, that is, when day breaks, the birds begin to sing; the King is the Sun, and his counting out his money is pouring out the sunshine, the golden shower of Danaë; the Queen is the Moon, and her transparent honey the moonlight; the Maid is the 'rosy-fingered' Dawn, who rises before the Sun, her master, and hangs out the clouds, his clothes, across the sky; the particular blackbird, who so tragically ends the tale by snipping off her nose, is the hour of sunrise." In all this interpretation there is no *a priori* improbability, save, perhaps, in its unbroken symmetry and completeness. That some points, at least, of the story are thus derived from antique interpretations of physical events, is in harmony with all that we know concerning nursery rhymes. In short, "the time-honored rhyme really wants but one thing to prove it a sun-myth, that one thing being a proof by some argument more valid than analogy." The character of the argument which is lacking may be illustrated by a reference to the rhyme about Jack and Jill. These ill-fated children have been proved to be the spots on the moon; the proof consisting, not in

the analogy, which is in this case not especially obvious, but in the fact that in the Edda, and among ignorant Swedish peasants of the present day, the story of Jack and Jill is actually given as an explanation of the moon-spots. To the neglect of this distinction between what is plausible and what is supported by direct evidence is due much of the crude speculation which encumbers the study of myths.

The physical theory of myths is richly illustrated by legends and observances which Mr. Tylor has culled from every quarter of the barbaric world. But in Mr. Tylor's book — to say nothing of its interesting chapters on primitive language, on the art of counting, etc. — the study of mythology is merged in the wider inquiry into the characteristic features of the mode of thinking in which myths originated. It is in this inquiry that his originality and good sense are chiefly conspicuous. It is encouraging to find a writer who can treat of primitive religious ideas without losing his head over allegory and symbolism, and who duly realizes the fact that a savage is not a rabbinical commentator, or a cabalist, or a Rosicrucian, but a plain man who draws conclusions like ourselves, albeit with feeble intelligence and scanty knowledge. The leading conclusion established by the inquiry is that myths and customs and beliefs which, in an advanced stage of culture, seem meaningless, find their explanation in a reference to lower stages. Myths, like words, survive their primitive meanings; and hence it results that the higher culture may be a further development of the lower, while the lower culture cannot be a degradation from the higher. In the primitive stage the myth is part and parcel of the current mode of philosophizing; the explanation which it offers is, for the time, the natural one, the one which would most readily occur to any one thinking on the theme with which the myth is concerned. But by and by the mode of philosophizing changes; explanations which formerly seemed quite obvious no longer occur to any one, but the myth has acquired an independent substantive existence, and continues to be handed down from parents to children as something true, though no one can tell why it is true. Lastly, the myth itself gradually fades from remembrance, often leaving behind it some utterly unintelligible custom, or seemingly absurd superstitious notion. For example, it is still believed here and there by some old granny that it is wicked to kill robins; but he who should attribute the belief to the old granny's refined sympathy with all sentient existence, would be making the same blunder which is committed by all those who reason *a priori* about historical matters without following the historical method. At an earlier date the superstition existed in the shape of a belief that the killing of a robin portends some calamity;

in a still earlier form the calamity is specified as death; and again, still earlier, as death by lightning. Another step backward reveals that the dread sanctity of the robin is owing to the fact that he is the bird of Thor, the lightning god; and finally we reach that primitive stage of philosophizing in which the lightning is explained as a red bird dropping from its beak a worm which cleaveth the rocks. Again, the belief that some harm is sure to come to him who saves the life of a drowning man, is unintelligible until it is regarded as a case of survival in culture. In the older form of the superstition it is held that the rescuer will sooner or later be drowned himself; and thus we pass to the fetichistic interpretation of drowning as the seizing of the unfortunate person by the water-spirit, who is naturally angry at being deprived of his victim, and henceforth bears a special grudge against the bold mortal who has thus dared to frustrate him.

The interpretations of the lightning as a red bird, and of drowning as the murderous work of a smiling but treacherous friend, are parts of that primitive philosophy of nature in which all forces objectively existing are conceived as identical with the force subjectively known as volition. To this philosophy, currently known as fetichism, Mr. Tylor devotes two thirds of his work; but his treatment of it includes far more than that mere anthropomorphization of physical events which we call fetichism. Under the title of "Animism" Mr. Tylor deals with the whole theory of a spirit-world, as understood by uncivilized men, and shows, with great minuteness of detail, how the whole fabric is most logically built up out of such materials as the savage has at his command. The thorough study of savage customs and of the oldest Aryan literature has shown, as a matter of fact, that the uncivilized thinker does something more than merely to invest outward phenomena with a quasi-human personality. He not only regards the howling wind as a person, but he conceives it to be a particular person or group of persons, namely, some ancestor or ancestors of his tribe; whence the notion, which still survives in contemporary Europe, that in the night-wind are borne along the souls of the dead. According to Mr. Tylor, the doctrine of animism begins with the belief in the survival of dead ancestors and relatives, which is quite logically based upon the fact of their reappearance in dreams. This is established by a thorough survey of the whole philosophy of ghosts, wraiths, and doubles, trances and delirium, and of the relations of the soul to shadow, blood, and breath. On this primitive belief rests the almost universal custom of sacrificing the wives, servants, horses, and dogs of the departed chief of the tribe. After this beginning, the next step is to ascribe souls to plants and even to lifeless objects, such as the hatchet, or bow and ar-

rows, or food and drink, of the dead man. It is not only probable that uncivilized men would thus extend the doctrine of souls, since the same interpretation of shadows and of the things seen in dreams would apply to inanimate objects as to persons ; but we have abundant evidence that the doctrine has been thus extended. Fijis and other contemporary savages, when questioned, expressly declare that the spear and the axe are as immortal as their owner ; and thus we see the meaning of the offerings of food, ornaments, weapons, and money, which, in all countries, have been presented at the shrines of departed heroes. At a later stage, after surviving the phase of culture in which they originated, such offerings become mere memorials of affection or esteem for the dead man ; but at the outset they were presented in the belief that their ghosts would be eaten or otherwise employed by the ghost of the dead man. Now when this theory of object-souls is expanded into a general doctrine of spirits, the philosophic scheme of animism is completed. Once habituated to the conception of souls of knives and tobacco-pipes passing to the land of ghosts, the savage cannot avoid carrying the interpretation still further, so that wind and water, fire and storm, are accredited with indwelling spirits akin by nature to the soul which inhabits the human frame.

Scanty justice can be done to Mr. Tylor's admirable discussion of animism in a brief sketch, from which we are obliged to omit all concrete illustration. It is in the skill and sagacity with which such illustrations are introduced that one principal charm of Mr. Tylor's book consists. The author asks us to admit nothing on *a priori* evidence, for which irrefragable inductive proof cannot also be cited ; and at every step he halts to take his bearings, minutely scrutinizing the whole visible field. In tracking the wilderness of primeval speculation, he is a guide no less safe than delightful.

10.—*The Right One*. By MARIE SOPHIE SCHWARTZ. *Translated from the Swedish*. By SELMA BORG and MARIE A. BROWN. Boston : Lee and Shepard. 1871.

THERE must be some sense in the cry for a "larger sphere for woman," when two ladies who can read and write two languages can find no better employment for their time and talents than translating a book like the present. It is hard to see on what principle foreign novels are selected for the English reader ; certainly not usually for their merits, witness the so-called historical romances from the German